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THIRD PARTY RIGHTS UNDER NEW YORK FILING STATUTES FOR CHATTEL MORTGAGES
AND CONDITIONAL SALES
JESSE S. RAPHAEL

MANY confusions and inconsistencies have developed in the legal
decisions of the New York courts concerning the security interests
created by the chattel mortgage contract and by the conditional sales
contract. These shortcomings have their genesis in part in the common law concept of these devices and in part in legislative ineptitude
and poor draftsmanship as the common law rules were modified by
statute.
I.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES AT COMMON LAW

THE early New York courts, following the prevailing rule, conceived of the chattel mortgage as a security device whereby the borrower transferred title to specific tangible personal property to the

lender, the title being defeasible on payment of the debt on the law

day.1 If at the time of the transaction the mortgagee took physical
possession of the chattel, the transaction took on the characteristics
of a pledge. Third persons, such as creditors of the mortgagor (pledgor), purchasers from the mortgagor (pledgor), or those receiving
from the mortgagor other interests in the property, were all subordinate to the security interest of the mortgagee (pledgee) in possession,
regardless of notice.2 But, if, after the mortgage was executed, the
borrower, as was commonly the case, was allowed to remain in possession of the mortgaged chattel, the transaction came under and
ran afoul of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth 3 dealing with fraudulent conveyances. Conseqilently, a creditor of the mortgagor who levied on
the mortgaged chattel prevailed over the mortgagee on the theory
that the mortgage was void as a fraudulent conveyance. 4 The mortgagee's security interest might also be defeated in favor of a creditor
JEssE S. RAPHAEL is Professor of Law at New York Law School and at Pace College

and a Member of the Citizens Union Committee on Legislation.

1 Parshall v. Eggert, 54 N. Y. 18 (1873); Glenn, The Chattel Mortgage as a Statu-

tory Security, 25 Va. L. Rev. 316 (1939).
2 See supra, note 1, Glenn; Commercial Bank v. Davy, 81 Hun 200, 202 (Sup.
Ct. N. Y. Co. 1903); Levin v. Russell, 42 N. Y. 251, 255 (1888); Swift v. Hart,
12 Barb. 530 (N. Y. 1879); Nixon v. Stanley, 33 Hun. 247 (N. Y. 1898).
3 13 Eliz. c. 5 (1571).
4 Twynes' Cases, 3 Co. So b (K. B. 1601); In re Packard Press; 5 F. 2d 633,
635 (2d Cir. 1925).
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of the mortgagor on the theory that the latter was clothed with
"ostensible ownership" by reason of his possession. Hence, declared
the courts, the mortgagee was estopped from asserting his interest as
against one who extended credit to the mortgagor in reliance on his
5
ostensible ownership.
A chattel mortgage recording act was necessary, therefore, "not
so much to regulate the rights of the parties as to validate the transaction by removing it from the purview of the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances."'
II.

CONDITIONAL SALE AT COMMON

LAW

THE conditional sales contract was not considered a security device under Common Law. The early New York courts conceived of
it as a contract to sell, under which the owner of the chattel bailed
it to the other contracting party with a privilege in the latter to become owner of the chattel on payment of the full amount set as the
purchase price.7 Treated as bailment, the contract required no public recording to protect the rights of the bailor-vendor. The baileevendee had, indeed, a kind of property interest, but he had no title
of any kind which he could convey or which could become subject
to a creditor's levy, so as to defeat the bailor-vendor's ownership.8
There being no conveyance, but merely a contract to sell, the Statute
of Elizabeth did not cover or affect the transaction.

III.

PERFECTING THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE SECURITY INTEREST

AS AGAINST MORTGAGOR'S CREDITORS
THE first New York statute providing for the public recording 9
of chattel mortgages was enacted in 1833. It reads as follows:
"Every mortgage, or conveyance intended to operate as a mortgage, of goods and chattels hereafter made, which shall not be accompanied by an immediate delivery, and be followed by an actual
5 Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316, 32 N. E. 1073, 49 St. Rep. 740 (1893); Meech
v. Patchin, 14 N. Y. 71 (1888); Gregory v. Thomas, 20 Wend. 13 (N. Y. 1884).

6 See supra note 1, Glenn at 326.
7 Ballard et al. v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314 (1869); Austin v. Dye, 46 N. Y. 500

(1871).

8 Glenn, Conditional Sales at Common Law and as a Statutory Security, 25 Va.

L. Rev'.' 559, 574 (1939), citing Cutting v. Whittemore, 72 N. H. 107, 54 Adt. 1098

(1903); Vold, The Divided Property Interest in Conditional Sales, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev.
713 (1930); see note 7, supra.
9 The act did not require a "recording," but a "filing" of the contract or a copy
thereof in the designated public office.
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and continued change of possession of the things mortgaged, shall
be absolutely void as against the creditors of the mortgagor, and as
against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith unless
the mortgage, or a true copy thereof, shall be filed as directed in the
succeeding section of this act."'"
Although often amended (and by Laws 1897, Chap. 418, Sect. 90,
transferred to the Lien Law"), the language remains substantially
the same today. The section reflects the common law view that a
mortgage is absolutely ineffectual as against creditors of the mortgagor unless the mortgage is properly filed. Although the courts have
called the language of this section "direct," "positive," "plain" and
"explicit,"' 2 it is actually far from clear. As to which "creditors" is.
the mortgage void? May a creditor who extended credit to the mortgagor before the mortgage was executed take advantage of its nonfiling? Such a creditor had no lien on any specific property of the
debtor. Suppose, before such a creditor levied on or attached a specific chattel, the debtor conveyed the title of it to a mortgagee as security for current value. In the absence of fraud shown, why should
such a creditor (especially if he had knowledge of the mortgage transaction) be entitled to prevail at a later date merely because the
mortgagee failed to file his contract? The theory that the public filing
of the mortgage constituted "constructive notice" could not affect his
rights. He had not been misled by the mortgagee's failure to file,
since he had extended credit before the mortgage was executed. Nevertheless, the courts, undoubtedly influenced by the common law view
of chattel mortgages (after some confusion as to whether a creditor
had the right to prevail if he was a mere creditor rather than a levying creditor) construed the statute as declaring unfiled mortgages
void as to creditors generally.' 3 Hence the creditor who extended
credit before the mortgage was executed could later, by attachment
or levy on the mortgaged chattel, effectuate a lien superior to the lien
of the chattel mortgage.
10 N. Y. Sess. Laws 1833, c. 279.
11 N. Y. Lien Law § 230.
12 See supra, note 5, Karst v. Gane; Thompson v. Van Vechten, 27 N. Y. 568
(1912); 'In re Watts-Woodward Press Inc., 181 Fed. 71 (2d Cir. 1910).
'3 Eager, The Law of Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales § 127 (Buffalo,
N. Y. 1941), citing, Tooker v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 194 N. Y. 442, 87 N. E. 773 (1909);
Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316, 32 N. E. 1073, 49 St. Rep. 740 (1893); Stich v. Pirk],
100 Misc. 594, 115 N. Y. Supp. 440 (Sup. Ct. Ulster Co. 1917); Skilton v. Codington,
185 N. Y. 80, 77 N. E. 790, 113 Am. St. Rep. 885 (1906).
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What if the mortgagee filed his mortgage, but a creditor extended
credit to the mortgagor between the time of the execution of the
mortgage and the time of filing? The courts had no hesitancy
in deciding that such a creditor would likewise prevail over the mortgagee in either of two circumstances: (1) Although the mortgage
was promptly filed, if the creditor levied on or attached the mortgaged
property prior to the time of filing; 14 (2) if the mortgage was "improperly" filed or filed more than a reasonable time after its execution.15
As to the latter circumstance, it should be noted that the Lien
Law did not from the beginning and never has provided a statutory time limit for filing chattel mortgages. The time limit (a reasonable time after execution of the mortgage) is the result of judicial
legislation. 6 After deliberately inventing a time limit by interpretation of the statute, the courts declared that a creditor, whether he
extended credit to the mortgagor before execution of the mortgage,
or in the interim between execution and filing, prevailed over the
mortgagee, if the mortgage was filed more than a reasonable time
after its execution. The creditor prevailed even though he had actual notice of the mortgage at the time he extended credit.1 7 The
creditor prevailed even though he attached or levied on the mortgaged property long after the mortgagee had publicly, but belatedly,
filed the mortgage.' 8 Here again one sees the survival of the common
law theory of the chattel mortgage, namely, that it is a "worthless"
instrument giving the mortgagee no rights whatsoever against creditors
of the mortgagor unless the mortgagee strictly follows the statute
and files properly and timely.
Suppose a mortgage is filed unreasonably late, but a creditor extends credit to the mortgagor after the mortgage has been so filed.
14 Keller v. Paine, 107 N. Y. 83, 13 N. E. 635 (1905); Huber v. Ehlers, 76 App.
Div. 602, 79 N. Y. Supp. 150 (4th Dep't 1902) (as to purchaser who takes delivery
before filing).
15 See notes 12 and 13, supra.
16 See supra, note 5, Karst v. Gane and cases therein cited; Meisel Tire Co. v.
Ralph, 164 Misc. 845, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 143 (City Ct. Rochester 1937).
17 See. sWpra, note 5, Karst v. Gane; Reynolds v. Webb, - Misc. -, 166 N. Y.
Supp. 668 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Co. 1917); Ledoux v. East River Silk Co., 19 Misc. 440,
44 N. Y. Supp. 489 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1879); see supra, note 13, Eager § 128;
Tyler v. Strang et al., 21 Barb. 200 (N. Y. 1855).
18 See supra, note 1, Glenn at 336; Reynolds v. Webb, - Misc. -, 166 N. Y.
Supp. 668 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Co. 1917); see supra, note 5, Karst v. Gane; Nucci
v. McCollum, 149 Misc. 1025, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 619 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 1949).
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To be consistent, a late filed mortgage should be void as to all creditors of the mortgagor, including such a creditor. But the lower courts
in New York have held that such a creditor is not in a position to
attack the mortgage on the ground of late filing.19
On the other hand, if the mortgagee files promptly, he should be
safe. But that is not the case. There must inevitably be a time interval between the execution of a chattel mortgage and its filing, unless the mortgage is executed at the public filing office and filed immediately after execution.' If a creditor, knowing that the mortgage
has been or is about to be executed, succeeds in levying on or attaching the mortgaged chattel before the mortgagee has had an opportunity
to bring it to the proper public office for filing, the creditor's lien prevails over the mortgagee's despite the prompt filing."
IV.

PERFECTING THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT SECURITY
INTEREST AS AGAINST VENDEE'S CREDITORS

As stated earlier in this article, a conditional vendor, at common
law, perfected his security reservation of title against creditors of
the conditional vendee by the mere execution of the conditional sales
contract. 2 ' Since the conditional vendee, before full payment of the
purchase price, was a mere bailee of the sold chattel, his creditors
could not, by attachment or levy on the chattel, obtain a lien superior
to the conditional vendor's security interest. No public recording was
required. But as these purchase-bailment contracts grew in use,
strong pressure was brought on the courts and legislature to provide
some kind of protection for those who innocently dealt with the conditional vendee in possession of the sold chattel believing him to be
its owner. Secret liens and secret reservations of title had become unpopular. A requirement that the transaction be revealed by public
filing would afford a solution. Public filing would be a measure of protection to innocent third parties.22
So, in 1884, the first conditional sales filing statute was en19 The point has not come up in the court of appeals. However, New York
Courts have followed Federal decisions. In re Myers, 19 F. 2d 600 (N. D. N. Y. 1927),
aff'd, 24 F. 2d 349 (2d Cir. 1928); Petition of Planz, 282 App. Div. 552, 125 N. Y. S. 2d
780; Weintraub, Levin and Beldock, The Strong Arm Clause Strikes the Belated Chattel
Mortgage, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 261 (1956).
20 Keller et al. v. Paine, 107 N. Y. 83, 13 N. E. 635 (1887); Hathaway v. Howell, 54 N. Y. 97, 102 (1873).
21 See note 8, supra.
22 See supra, note 8, Glenn at 575-76.
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acted. 23 It did not, however, protect creditors of the conditional vendee. On the contrary, by omitting any provision as to creditors, it
continued the common law rule that a conditional vendee had no
interest in the chattel on which his creditors could levy in contravention of the vendor's reservation of title. The statute made the conditional vendor's security interest void for non-filing only as against
purchasers and mortgagees who, without actual notice of the conditional vendor's security interest, dealt with the conditional vendee
subsequent to the execution of the conditional sale contract.2 4
The requirement of filing, as a prerequisite to perfecting the
conditional vendor's security interest against creditors of the conditional vendee was first enacted in 1922 when the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act was offered for adoption in New York State. The legislature did not at that time adopt the uniform statute as written. 25
But by an amendment in 1938,26 the pertinent provision of the New
York State Act (section 65 of the Personal Property Law) was made
identical with section 5 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, except
that a sentence was added providing that the section does not apply
to conditional sales of goods for resale. Section 65 of the Personal
Property Law reads as follows:
"Every provision in a conditional sale reserving property in the
seller shall be void as to any purchaser from, or creditor of the
buyer, who, without notice of such provision, purchases the goods or
acquires by attachment or levy a lien upon them, before the contract
or copy thereof shall be filed as hereinafter provided, unless such
contract or copy is so filed within ten days after the making of the
conditional sale. This section shall not apply to conditional sales of
goods for resale."
A comparison of this section with the cognate section of the Lien
Law reveals several vital differences between the two statutes in relation to creditors. In the first place, only a creditor without actual
notice of the provisions in the conditional sales contract, reserving
title in the conditional vendor, can prevail over the vendor's security
23 N. Y. Sess. Laws 1884, c. 395. The statute was incorporated in the Lien Law
as Chapter IX, by N. Y. Sess. Laws 1897, c. 418, at which time pledgees in good
faith were added to purchasers and mortgagees as being protected against an unfiled
contract. The statute was transferred to the Personal Property Law Article IV by
N. Y. Sess. Laws 1909, c. 45.
24 The 1884 statute provided that an unfiled conditional sale contract was void
as to "subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith."
25 N. Y. Sess. Laws 1922, c. 642.
26 N. Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 65.
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interest.2 7 Secondly, even a creditor who extends credit without notice of the prior conditional sale is, nevertheless subject to it unless
he attaches or levies on the subject chattel before the conditional sale
contract is filed.2" As in the case of the chattel mortgage statute,
there is no statutory time limit for filing a conditional sale contract.
But, differing from the Lien Law as construed by the courts, no penalty is suffered by the conditional vendor if he files unreasonably late,
unless prior to his filing the vendee's creditor has attached or levied
on the property. 29 The conditional vendor is given a further advantage. If he files his contract within ten days from the date of its
execution, his security interest will prevail over an innocent creditor
of the vendee who attaches or levies on the chattel in the interim between execution of the contract and the filing.30 This "relation back"
is not present in the chattel mortgage filing act.
The impact on creditors' rights of the filing requirements in both
statutes may then be summed up as follows: (1) An unfiled chattel
mortgage may be set aside or ignored by any creditor of the mortgagor at any time, whether or not he has actual notice of it. An unfiled conditional sale contract may be set aside by a creditor of the
vendee only if (i) he attaches or levies on the chattel and (ii) if he
has no actual notice of the vendor's reservation of title up to the time
of attachment or levy. (2) A chattel mortgage filed more than a
reasonable time after its execution may be set aside by any creditor
who has extended credit prior to the filing, with or without notice of
27 The courts hold that the burden of proof as to lack of notice is on the creditor.
Sisson v. The First National Bank et al., 233 App. Div. 506, 254 N. Y. Supp. 527
(3d Dep't 1931); Tompkins v. Fonda Glove Lining Co., 188 N. Y. 261, 80 N. E. 933
(1907); McLinden v. McLinden, - Misc. -, 138 N. Y. S. 2d 307 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
Co. 1955); Biederman v. Edson & Co., 128 Misc. 455, 219 N. Y. Supp. 115 (Sup. Ct.
App. T. 1st Dep't 1926); Murphy et al. v. Luverne Realty Corp., 235 App. Div. 874,
257 N. Y. Supp. 694 (2d Dep't 1932). The courts are in conflict as to whether notice
to a sheriff is notice to a creditor. N. B. I. Corp. v. Keller, 175 Misc. 231, 23 N. Y. S.
2d 59 (Monroe Co. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 881, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 1017 (4th Dep't
1941); Compare, Edwards v. Walker, 162 Misc. 96, 293 N. Y. S. 1007 (Suffolk Co.
Ct. 1937).
28 Issuance of process is not sufficient. Actual attachment or levy must be made.
Baker v. Hull, 250 N. Y. 484, 166 N. E. 175 (1929). In the N. B. I. Corp. case, see
supra, note 27, the creditor had no notice when execution was issued, but notice was
given to the deputy sheriff when he levied. The proposed Uniform Chattel Mortgage
Act would remove this injustice. See, Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings at 417 (1926).
29 New York Law Revision Commission-Report, Recommendations and Studies,
Leg. Doc. No. 65 at 182 (1938); White v. E. C. McKallor Drug Co., 239 App. Div.
210, 268 N. Y. Supp. 371 (3d Dep't 1933).
30 2 U. L. A. 9, Commissioner's Note to Sec. 5, U. C. S. A.
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the mortgage interest. A conditional sale contract filed more than a
reasonable time after its execution prevails over creditors of the conditional vendee unless the creditor levies on or attaches the sold chattel before the contract is filed and unless, at the time he levies or
attaches, he has no knowledge of the vendor's security interest. (3) A
chattel mortgage may be defeated by a creditor of the mortgagor who
levies on or attaches the mortgaged chattel before the chattel mortgage contract is filed, even though the filing is prompt and timely. A
conditional vendor's security interest is not defeated by a creditor who
attaches or levies on the sold chattel before filing, if the attachment
or levy is made within ten days after the conditional sale contract
was executed and if the conditional vendor files his contract before
the expiration of the ten day period.
V.

PERFECTING THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE SECURITY INTEREST
AS AGAINST CREDITORS'

REPRESENTATIVES

SINCE a simple creditor of the mortgagor has the power, by statute and judicial construction to set aside a mortgage executed by his
debtor, but not perfected, it would be logical to presume that a similar power exists in favor of a creditor's representative, such as an
equity receiver, 31 an assignee for the benefit of creditors,3 2 an executor or administrator of a decedent debtor's estate, 33 and a trustee
in bankruptcy.34 And such is the case with some qualifications.
An unfiled, late filed, or improperly filed chattel mortgage will be
set aside at the instance of these representatives on the theory that,
if they represent at least one simple creditor of the mortgagor who
could have prevailed over the mortgagee because of a filing imperfection, the representative has a similar right.3 1 The right of an
31 American & British Securities Co. v. American & British Mfg. Corp., 275 Fed.
121 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); In re Rambler Cafeteria, 9 F. 2d 861 (2d Cir. 1925).
32 Stich v. Pirkl, 100 Misc. 594, 166 N. Y. Supp. 440 (Sup. Ct. Ulster Co.
1917). If, however, the mortgage was promptly filed, and a creditor would only prevail if he levied before filing, an assignee for the benefit of creditors, where the assignment was made before filing, would not prevail. See, Matter of Paramount Finishing
Corp., 259 N. Y. 558, 182 N. E. 180 (1932).
33 Matter of Shay, 157 Misc. 615; 285 N. Y. Supp. 379 (Surr. Ct. Livingston
Co. 1935) ; Beebe v. Prime, 99 Misc. 668, 166 N. Y. Supp. 56 (Sup. Ct. Essex Co. 1917) ;
Matter of Munson, 70 Misc. 461, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1106 (Surr. Ct. Saratoga Co. 1911);
In re McGovern, - Misc. -, 118 N. Y. Supp. 378 (Surr. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1908).
34 Skilton v. Codington, 185 N. Y. 80, 77 N. E. 790 (1906); In the Matter of
Gondola Associates, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 205 (E. D. N. Y. 1955).
35 Moore v. Bay, 284 U. S. 4, 52 S. Ct. 3, 76 L. Ed. 133 (1919); General
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executor or administrator of a decedent mortgagor, as creditor representative, to attack the validity of the mortgage because of filing defects seems to be limited to those cases in which the estate is insolvent, i.e., where there are insufficient estate assets to pay the creditors in full. 6 Such a rule is logical. It is difficult to see how an
executor or administrator who is in his own right neither a creditor of
the decedent nor a purchaser or encumbrancer of the decedent's
property, could, because of his duty to pay estate creditors, exercise
the rights of a creditor so as to increase the size of the estate-not
for the benefit of the estate creditors but for the benefit of estate
beneficiaries, such as legatees or distributees. Nevertheless, the looseness of the language of some of the decisions might lead one to think
37
otherwise.
Assignees for the benefit of creditors did not, by the earlier cases,
have the power to attack a chattel mortgage executed by the assignor
on the ground of filing imperfections.38 The earlier courts held that
the assignee stood in the shoes of the assignor and had no greater
rights than he had. But by an amendment to section 17 of the
Debtor and Creditor Law, 39 the assignee acquired the right to set
aside any lien which could have been set aside by a creditor of the
assignor. After that amendment, assignees have been successful in
setting aside chattel mortgages not properly perfected. °
The power of trustees in bankruptcy in this regard has varied
with the amendments made from time to time in the Bankruptcy Act.
The Bankruptcy Act4 ' (from which section 17 of the New York
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Raz Delivery,, Inc., 238 App. Div. 27, 264 N. Y. Supp.
412 (4th Dep't 1933). Since the 1952 A/iendment (sec. 70(c)) of the Bankruptcy
Act, the trustee has the status of an "ideal hypothetical creditor" even though no
such creditor actually exists.
36 See note 33, supra.
37 See supra, note 33, Matter of Shay; In re Herlihy's Estate, - Misc. -, 38
N. Y. S. 2d 663 (Surr. Ct. Westchester Co. 1942). In the latter case the court said
at page 665: "It is well settled that in the event of failure to properly file such chattel mortgage the mortgaged property becomes an unincumbered asset of the deceased
mortgagor's estate, subject to the payment of debts owing to creditors of the de-

cedent."
38 Sheldon v. Wickham, 161 N. Y. 500, 55 N. E. 1045 (1900).
39 N. Y. Sess. Laws 1914, c. 360 § 4, which reads: "Claims which for want of
record or for other reasons would not have been valid as against the claims of creditors of the assignor shall not be liens against his estate."
40 See supra, note 32, Stich v. Pirkl.
41 30 Stat. 564 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. 107(A) (1953).
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Debtor and Creditor Law was copied), gave trustees in bankruptcy,
representing creditors of a mortgagor, the power to set aside a mortgage for non-filing, late filing or improper filing, if any creditor
of the bankrupt's estate could have done so.
Prior to 1938, the Federal decisions held that if the power of the
trustee in bankruptcy depended on his being a lien creditor, the lien
of the trustee must be deemed to have arisen on the date the petition in bankruptcy was filed and not before. 2 So, if a mortgage was
executed on September 8th and filed reasonably promptly on September 10th, the trustee in bankruptcy could set aside the mortgage
if the bankruptcy petition was filed on September 9th, but not if it
was filed on September l1th.
The 1938 and 1950 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act have
been construed, however, to give the trustee far greater power than
formerly to set aside liens even where the lien is perfected as against
all creditors whom the trustee actually represents. For example, as
stated earlier in this Article," the courts of New York have held that
if a mortgagee files his chattel mortgage in the proper place, but unreasonably late, nevertheless, a creditor who extended credit to the
mortgagor after the filing could not attack the mortgage. Suppose the
mortgagor went into bankruptcy after the late filing and had no creditor whose claim accrued prior to such filing. Could the trustee in
bankruptcy set aside the mortgage? The Federal court in Constance
v. Harvey,44 said yes. The trustee in bankruptcy under the 1952
amendment of the Act has the status of an "ideal" creditor even
though one does not actually exist. 45 Hence the trustee in bankruptcy could take advantage of a filing imperfection to set aside a
mortgage given by the mortgagor-bankrupt even though, in the absence of bankruptcy, none of the mortgagor's creditors could have
done so.
42 In re Alvon Syrup Corp., 25 F. 2d 342 (N. D. N. Y. 1928); In re Excelsior
Macaroni Co., 55 F. 2d 406 (E. D. N. Y. 1931).

43 See note 19, .supra.
44

215 F. 2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954).

45 In the Matter of Gondola Associates, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 205 (E. D. N. Y. 1955).
In following the rule of Constance v. Harvey, see, supra, note 44, the court said:
"The result here reached seems incongruous; a state statute enacted to protect creditors
who are such at a given date is held to operate in favor of a trustee in bankruptcy
who really stands in empty shoes, for he occupies a space which does not exist, since
there is no creditor who might enforce the right which he asserts." To same effect see,
Conti v. Volper, 132 F. Supp. 205 (E. D. N. Y. 1955), aff'd, 299 F. 2d 317 (2d Cir.

1956).
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PERFECTING THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT SECURITY

INTEREST AS AGAINST CREDITORS' REPRESENTATIVES

THE situation with respect to the rights of such creditors' representatives as against a conditional vendor (in which the debtor was
conditional vendee) is entirely different. Since the equity receiver,
the assignee for the benefit of creditors and the administrator and
executor are not clothed by statute or common law with the power
of a levying or attaching creditor, they do not qualify to set aside
an unfiled, late filed, or improperly filed conditional sale contract. 4 6
This discrimination in favor of one class of creditors' representatives
-depending on whether the transaction takes the form of a chattel
mortgage, or the form of a conditional sale--calls for remedial changes
in legislation. A suggested reform in this regard will be taken up at
the end of this article in connection with other suggestions for recommended change.

VII.

PERFECTING SECURITY INTERESTS AS AGAINST SUBSEQUENT
PURCHASERS AND ENCUMBRANCERS

As stated earlier, the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances (13
Elizabeth) 47 made chattel mortgages, in which the mortgagor remained in possession of the mortgaged chattel, void as to creditors
only. Chapter IV of 27 Elizabeth declared that in a like situation,
the chattel mortgage was likewise a fraudulent conveyance and void
as to subsequent "bona fide" purchasers. The New York courts followed this rule as part of the common law. Chapter 279 of the New
York State Laws of 1833 made the rule statutory by providing that
where the mortgagor remained in possession of the mortgaged chattel
and the mortgage was not filed in accordance with the statute, the
mortgage was void "as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees
in good faith."
The term "good faith," by a long line of court decisions was interpreted as meaning (1) for current value and not in exchange for
the cancellation of an antecedent debt;4" and (2) without notice of
46 Quinn v. Bancroft-Jones Corp. et al., 18 F. 2d 727 (2d Cir. 1927); Matter of
Caruso-Sturcey Corp., 200 Misc. 936, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 693 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co.
1951); It re Pellegrini, 248 App. Div. 526, 290 N. Y. Supp. 774 (2d Dep't 1936);
See, supra, note 37, In re Herlihy's Estate.
47 See note 3, supra.
48 See supra, note 13, Eager §§ 140-41, citing cases; Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570
(N. Y. 1835).
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the mortgagee's interest.49 Filing the chattel mortgage contract was
a substitute for actual notice. Since the rights of a subsequent purchaser rise or fall on the question of notice-actual or constructivethe time of filing has no significance; a late filing is just as effective
as a prompt filing, as long as the filing takes place before the plirchase is made.5" The chattel mortgage and conditional sales statutes
are alike in this regard except as to the ten-day "relation back" provision in the conditional sales statute.
By using the term "good faith" instead of a more definite expression such as "for current value and without notice," the legislature opened the door to varying judicial interpretations. Must "good
faith" inevitably mean "for current value"? A modern court might
well decide that a purchaser who exchanges an antecedent debt for a
chattel previously mortgaged, is a purchaser in "good faith." 1 Must
the term "good faith" inevitably mean "lack of notice"? The legislature has thrown doubt on this by using, in one amendment 2 the
words "in good faith and without actual knowledge," thereby raising a possible presumption that "good faith" means something other
than "without notice."
Today's construction of the term "in good faith" has been further obscured by a 1937 amendment, to the Lien Law5 3 which makes
the statute read that an unfiled chattel mortgage is void as against
"subsequent purchasers, mortgagees . . . in good faith and for a fair
consideration." Will the courts construe this amendment as meaning that "fair consideration" includes past consideration? The mere
fact of the statutory addition indicates a legislative doubt as to
whether "good faith" properly includes the question of consideration.
Since the 1937 amendmefnt, a case arose in the lower courts concerning the rights of a purchaser of a chattel.54 The purchase was
49 See note 48, supra.
50 Associates Discount Corp. v. Davis Motor Sales, 275 App. Div. 745, - N. Y.
S. 2d (4th Dep't 1949). The case concerns a purchase after a conditional sale
contract was filed but the principle is the same.
51 Buffalo Hebrew Social Club Federal Credit Uniqn v. David Coles et al., 289
App. Div. 998, - N. Y. S. 2d - (4th Dep't 1955).
52 N. Y. Sess. Laws 1922, c. 642. The New York adaptation of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, in section 69, deals with the rights of purchasers from the conditional vendee when the latter has the right to resell. The section states that the vendor's reservation of title ". . .shall be void against purchasers from the buyer in good
faith for value and without actual knowledge of the condition . . ." of the contract.
53 N.

Y.

Sess. Laws 1937, c. 810.

54 Gray v. Brasee, -

Misc. -,

14 N. Y. S. 2d 687 (Sup. Ct. Delaware Co. 1939);
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made in exchange for an antecedent debt. There was a chattel mortgage on the subject chattel which had been filed unreasonably late.
Although it appears not to have been necessary to the decision, the
court in deciding against the purchaser re-confirmed the old rule
that a purchaser for an antecedent debt was not a purchaser in good
faith. The court did not mention the 1937 amendment referred to
above.
The 1884 Act governing the filing of conditional sales contracts
continued using the expression "in good faith" as a qualification of
purchasers and mortgagees who could prevail over an unfiled contract.
But when the provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act were
adopted in 1922, the term "good faith" was dropped and the expression "without notice of such provision" (i.e., the provisions in the
contract reserving title in the conditional vendor) was substituted. 5
The expression "without notice" etc., has a considerably narrower
connotation than "good faith" and was so construed by the courts.
For example, in one case56 (dealing with a creditor, but the principle
is the same), the conditional vendee of a truck informed the deputy
sheriff who levied on it "that the truck did not belong to deponent,
that it was bought through Universal Credit Company and that it
was not paid for." Such information of a possible outstanding security interest would probably affect the "good faith" status of the
one informed. But the court held that the notice was insufficient,
since the statute declared notice must be "of the provision" in the
conditional sales contract reserving title in the vendor. Hence the
levying creditor was "without notice."
By using the expression "without notice" in the conditional sales
statute, instead of "good faith" as in the chattel mortgage statute,
another difference in interpretation and rights of third parties has
developed. As previously stated,57 a purchaser "in good faith" has
been held to be a purchaser for current value and not for past consideration. But, by definition in the sections of the Personal Property Law dealing with sales and conditional sales, "value" includes
an antecedent debt. Hence, a person who innocently purchases a
chattel from a conditional vendee, in consideration of the cancellaSee also, Steckler v. Fabrikant, 2 A. D. 2d 900, 157 N. Y. S. 2d 84 (2d Dep't
1956).
55 N. Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 65.
56 See, supra, note 27, N. B. I. Corp. v. Keller.
57 See note 48, supra.
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tion of an antecedent debt, before the conditional sale contract is
properly filed, will prevail over the conditional vendor.58 If the purchase had been made under the same circumstances, but the form of
the security transaction affecting the chattel had been a chattel mortgage instead of a conditional sale, the purchaser would not prevail
over the mortgagee's security interest. 59
VIII.

PROPER PLACE OF FILING

BOTH of the statutes under discussion provide that the security
interest is void as to the designated third parties unless the instrument involved is "properly filed."6' Proper filing includes the proper
place of filing, as well as the proper time of filing. To have the instrument filed in the proper place is of extreme importance to the
person holding the security interest (since his protection depends on
proper filing), and to third parties: (1) those who search the
public records to determine in advance whether a particular chattel
is or is not subject to an outstanding security interest before they
deal with its ostensible owner; and (2) those, who being confronted
with an outstanding security interest, seek to prevail over it on the
ground that the contract creating the interest was not filed in the
proper place and was therefore not filed at all so far as they are
concerned.
The paragraphs which follow will concern the provisions in the
statutes as to the proper place of filing.
As to Chattel Mortgages-Piecemeal amendments to section 232
of the Lien Law, governing the place of filing, although conscientiously aimed at "clarification" have only served to make the procedure more complicated and more difficult to follow with safety.
The statute appears to set up four different situations (existing
at the time the mortgage was executed) on which the place of filing
depends: (1) If the mortgagor is a resident of the state and the chattel
is "situated" in the state but outside New York City; (2) if the
mortgagor is a non-resident of the state and the chattel is located in
the state, including New York City; (3) if there are two or more
mortgAgors resident in different towns or cities, outside New York
58 See note 51, supra; See also, New York Law Revision Commission-Report,
Recommendations and Studies at 21-32 (1935); see, supra, note 13, Eager § 345.
59 See note 48, supra.
60 N. Y. Lien Law § 230; N. Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 65.
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City, or counties within New York City; (4) if the chattels are located in New York City, regardless of the place of residence of the
mortgagor or mortgagors.
If the mortgagor is a resident of the state and the chattel "is"
outside New York City, then the mortgage is to be filed in the office
of the clerk of the town or city in which the mortgagor resides, if
he resides outside New York City. If that town or city has a county
clerk's office in it (because it is the county seat), then the mortgage
must be filed in the County Clerk's office and not in the office of the
town or city clerk. If the mortgagor resides in a county within New
York City, then the mortgage must be filed in the Register's office
of the resident county, or the County Clerk's office of the resident
county, whichever one the statute specifically designates.
On the question of residence, the courts have taken the position
that the statute is mandatory and must be rigidly followed. 1 That
is to say, the mortgagee must discover, at his peril, where the mortgagor actually resides! For example, the address given by the mortgagor in the mortgage is not the proper place for filing, if his "actual"
residence is elsewhere.6
Outside of New York City, the town or city is taken as the
geographical area for determining place. Post office addresses frequently differ from township addresses and therefore confusion easily
results. In Edwards v. Walker,13 dealing with a conditional sale (the
statute in this regard is the same as for chattel mortgages), the
vendee gave as his address "Winne-Cha Farm, Commack, L. I.,"
which was his proper post office address. The village of Commack is
in Huntington Township, and so the vendor filed a copy of the contract in the clerk's office of that township. But Winne-Cha Farm was
located in Smithtown Township. For failure to file there, the court
held the conditional sale to be void as against a levying creditor.
If the mortgagor is a state resident and the chattel is outside
New York City, the mortgage need not be filed in the place where the
mortgaged property "is." It is, however, incumbent on the mortgagee
or his counsel to decide whether the mortgaged property "is" in New
York City or outside New York City.
61 Bauman
1893) and cases
62 See note
63 See note

v. Libetta, 3 Misc. 518, 23 N. Y. Supp. 1 (Common Pleas, N. Y. Co.
cited therein.
61, supra.
27, supra.
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If the chattel "is" in New York City at the time the mortgage
is executed, then the fourth criterion governs, and the mortgage must
be filed in at least two places, namely, the place where the mortgagor
"alleges" he resides and the county in New York City where the
mortgaged property "is." The statutory language used here creates
these ambiguities: How does the mortgagor make the "allegation"
of residence? May an oral allegation be sufficient? Or is the statement of the mortgagor's residence in the chattel mortgage contract
the controlling allegation?
If the mortgagor "alleges" that he resides in one town, city
or county, but he "actually" resides in another town, city or county,
does criterion number one also govern? That is, must the mortgagee
file both in the place of "actual" residence and the place of "alleged"
64
residence? The statute is certainly not clear on this point.
The mortgagee must also, at his peril, determine the location of
the chattel. Where "is" an ambulatory chattel at the time a mortgage
is executed? In Century Insurance Co., Limited v. Glidden Buick
5 Mr. Petrone who lived in Bronx County, New York
Corporation,"
City, drove his automobile to New York County, New York City,
to the office of Century Insurance Co., Limited, to execute a mortgage on his automobile. At the time he signed the instrument the
subject automobile was parked at the curb outside the finance company's office. The mortgagee did not file in New York County. Glidden Buick Corporation, without notice of the mortgage, later bought
the car from the mortgagor as a trade-in. Petrone defaulted on the
mortgage and the mortgagee sought to seize the car. The Buick Corporation claimed that the mortgage was void for improper filing,
since it was not filed in New York County where the car "was situated" at the time the mortgage was executed. The court held "no";
that the automobile was not "situated" in New York County within
the meaning of the statute. Said the court, a vehicle is "situated"
where it is usually kept. Suppose the chattel had been an airplane,
or a motorboat, or an excavator, which is usually moved from job to
64 Winters v. Municipal Capital Corp., 26 F. Supp. 330 (E. D. N. Y. 1939) in
which chattel mortgage stated mortgagor was "of" an address in New York County,
and the mortgagor orally informed mortgagee's agent to same effect, the mortgage
was properly filed in New York County although on the trial mortgagor testified that
he resided in Kings County. But see, Petition of Turchin, 260 App. Div. 447, 23 N. Y.
S. 2d 144 (1st Dep't 1940).
05 174 Misc. 149, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 108 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1940).

19571

THIRD PARTY RIGHTS

job? "Situs" of a chattel is frequently difficult to determine. Yet,
upon the proper answer depends the security rights of the mortgagee.
Section 232 of the Lien Law also requires a double filing "if there
is more than one county within the City of New York or town or
city within jhe state where each mortgagor resides. . . ." The phrase
is awkward and open to contradictory construction. Does it apply
to a transaction in which a single mortgagor has two or more residences in the state? (This is not a strained construction since the
courts in previous cases have held that "residence" within the purview of the statute is not synonymous with domicile.6 6) Or is the
phrase meant to cover only a transaction in which there are two or
more mortgagors with a diversity of residences? To make matters
worse, the courts have held that if a mortgagor is a partnership, and
the chattel is used for partnership purposes, nevertheless, for filing
purposes, the residences of the individual partners govern the place
67
of filing.
Thus the detailed provisions of section 232 create confusion and
the section as a whole is frequently abortive of its main purpose,
i.e., to serve as a constructive notice to creditors of the mortgagor
and to purchasers, pledgees and mortgagees who deal with the mortgagor after the original mortgage has been filed.
The filing requirement that the point of time which governs in
determining the residence of the mortgagor and the location of the
chattel is the time of the execution of the mortgage contract adds to
the frustration of the purposes of the statute. Innocent third parties frequently acquire their interests some time after the execution
of the original mortgage contract; at a time when the mortgagor may
have changed his residence, or when the chattel is kept elsewhere than
where it was when the contract was executed. Bear in mind that
where the mortgagor (or the chattel) moves to a new town or city
after the mortgage contract has been executed, the statute makes no
provision for refiling in the new location. 68 In such an event, consider
the plight, for example, of a prospective purchaser. He is about to
buy a chattel. Being wary, he asks the prospective seller if there are
66. Kemp v. Kemp, 172 Misc. 738, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 26 (Family Ct. N. Y. Co. 1939);
see, supra, note 27, Edwards v. Walker.
67 Russell v. St. Mart, 180 N. Y. 355, 73 N. E. 31 (1905); Ament v. Zaharion, 206
App. Div. 143, 200 N. Y. Supp. 595 (1st Dep't 1923).
68 Hicks v. Williams, 17 Barb. 523 (Sup. Ct. Oswego Co. 1854).
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any mortgage liens on the chattel, and the seller fraudulently answers
"no." But, being shrewd, the prospective buyer is not content to
rely on the seller's statement or warranty. He has his attorney search
the records for prior liens. The attorney searches of course in the
town, city or county where the mortgagor-seller then resides, not
knowing that a year before, when the mortgage (of which he has no
knowledge) was executed, the mortgagor resided elsewhere. The
search, therefore, yields no information. The buyer pays for the
chattel, only to find, a day, a month, a year or two later, that there
is an outstanding mortgage valid against him because it was properly
filed when executed. What price vigilance?
As to Conditional Sales-Section 66 of the Personal Property
Law governs with respect to the proper place for filing conditional
sales contracts. The language of this section differs materially from
that of the cognate section 232 of the Lien Law. It also differs from
section 6 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act which states that
filing in all cases shall be in the place where the goods "were first
kept for use by the buyer after the sale."
Under section 66, if the conditional vendee is a resident of the
state at the time the contract is executed, the contract must be filed
in the office of the town clerk, or of the city clerk, or the "recording"
officer, in the town, city, or borough of a city in which the conditional vendee resided. By "recording" officer is evidently meant a
county clerk or register who "records" deeds, etc., as distinguished
from filing.
Thus, the residence of an in-state resident conditional buyer governs the place of filing, regardless of the place in the state where the
chattel is located. If there is more than one conditional buyer (with
diversity of residence) the contract must be filed in the place of residence of each one. By judicial construction, a partnership buyer
would constitute a plural buyer and the place of filing would be
affected accordingly. 9
If the conditional buyer (or one or more of several) is a nonresident of the state, then the contract must be filed in the place
where the chattel itself is "first kept for use by the buyer after sale."
However, if any one or more of the plural buyers is a resident of
the state, and the others are non-residents, it would seem that the
69 See note 67, supra.
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contract must be filed in two places: (1) the place of residence of
the in-state resident buyers and (2) the place where the chattel was
first kept for use after sale.
While section 66 of the Personal Property Law is much clearer
than the cognate section 232 of the Lien Law, nevertheless, the same
difficulties as to the meaning of "residence" and the new problem of
the meaning of "first kept for use" make the section and the procedure under it, cumbersome, difficult to follow, and outmoded.
The conditional sale statute contains a provision as to place of
filing not to be found in the chattel mortgage filing statute.70 This
deals with a situation where, during the period between execution of
the contract and full payment of the debt, the chattel is moved from
the filing district in which it was originally located to a filing district
in which the contract has not been filed. In such a case, the conditional vendor must refile the contract in the new place of location
of the chattel within ten days after he receives notice of the place of
removal. Several aspects of this removal provision should be noted.
In the first place, if the conditional buyer was a resident of the state
when he signed the contract, the location of the chattel had no effect
on the place of filing. However, after the chattel is moved, the contract must be refiled. On the other hand, if the buyer moves to a
new filing place but the chattel stays where it was originally, no new
filing is required.
Second, regardless of the removal of the chattel to a new filing
place, the seller's reservation of title is good as to third parties without new filing until 10 days after the seller gets notice of the removal.
If he doesn't get notice, he need not refile throughout the valid period
of the original filing. This, of course, defeats the purpose of the
statute as a device for giving notice to third parties.
As in the chattel mortgage example given earlier, the subsequent
buyer who attempts to search records for outstanding conditional sale
security interests may be completely frustrated, if he searches the
then place of residence of the conditional buyer, or the then location
of the chattel. His success in finding a record of the conditional sale
will depend on the good faith and honesty of the conditional buyer,
the very person, for distrust of whom, he was led to search the records in the first place.
70 N. Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 74.
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IX. RPEFILING-PROPER TIME
the chattel mortgage and conditional sales filing statutes
provide that the original filing shall be valid for a period of three
years. 71 To continue perfecting of the security interest beyond the
original period requires a refiling each year thereafter. The refiling
must be done within the thirty day period next preceding the termi72
nation of the then current filing term.
As to chattel mortgages, the yearly refiling period is computed
from the date of the original filing; as to conditional sales, the second
and subsequent periods are computed from the date of the preceding
refiling. For example, if a chattel mortgage was originally filed on
December 31, 1954, the original filing period would expire on December 30, 1957. The first refiling must therefore take place between
December I and December 30, 1957. If the first refiling is made on
December 2, 1957, the first year's refiling period would nevertheless
begin on December 31, 1957, and end on December 30, 1958. If the
contract had been a conditional sale and it had been originally filed
on December 31, 1954, the original period of three years would expire December 30, 1957, as in the case of the chattel mortgage. But
if the conditional sale contract was refiled on December 2, 1957, the
first refiling year would expire on December 1, 1958, and the second
refiling would have to be made in the 30 days period next preceding
December 1, 1958.
The Law Revision Commission has recommended that the computation of refiling years be made uniform in the two statutes, 73 but,
so far, without avail.
In other respects, also, the refiling provisions of the two statutes
differ in language, and hence give rise to different interpretations by
the courts as to the rights of creditors, purchasers and other encumbrancers in those cases where the refiling provisions are not strictly
complied with.
For example, as in the case of original filing, a creditor who extends credit to a chattel mortgagor before the original filing period
of the mortgage expires, will be able to take advantage of an improper refiling (late, or in the wrong place), whether or not he has
BOTH

71 N. Y. Lien Law § 235; N. Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 71.
72 Ibid..
73 Report of New York Law Revision Commission at 789 (1936); Report of New
York Law Revision Commission at 65 (1937).
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actual knowledge of the mortgage. 4 On the other hand, even though
a conditional sale contract is refiled late, a creditor will not prevail
over the conditional vendor if, at the time he levies on the subject
chattel, he has notice of the outstanding security interest of the conditional vendor.

75

As to purchasers and encumbrancers, other than creditors, the
chattel mortgage refiling section provides that "A chattel mortgage
:

. .

shall be invalid against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees

in good faith, after the expiration of three years and thereafter after
the expiration of any succeeding term of one year . . ." unless it is

refiled in accordance with the provisions of the statute.
The courts hold that an innocent purchaser or mortgagee who
acquires his interest after the original filing period, or any later
properly extended filing period has expired, will prevail over the original mortgagee if the latter has not properly refiled his mortgage. But
a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee cannot take advantage of an
imperfect refiling or non-filing if such third party at the time of acquiring his interest has actual knowledge that the original mortgage
is still outstanding, since his rights depend on his "good faith" which
the courts have construed to mean "lack of actual notice."
It might be argued, from the language of the statute, that where
a mortgagee refiles late but does so before anyone has purchased or
taken a mortgage on the subject chattel, that the subsequent innocent
purchaser or mortgagee, acquiring his interest after the late refiling,
should not be entitled to prevail over the original mortgagee. The
statement in the statute that the mortgage is "invalid" etc., as to subsequent purchasers, etc., is no stronger than the language of the
statute relating to original filing. Since the courts have repeatedly
held that a subsequent purchaser cannot take advantage of a late
original filing, even though he is without notice, if he has bought the
mortgaged chattel after the late filing, it would be logical to suppose
that a subsequent innocent purchaser who bought after a late refiling would likewise be subject to the mortgagee's interest. But the
76
courts hold otherwise.
74 See, supra, note 12, In re Watts-Woodward Press, Inc., citing Skilton v. Codington, see, supra, note 13.
75 American Laundry Machine Co. v. Simon, 255 App. Div. 203, 6 N. Y. S. 2d
943 (4th Dep't 1938).
76 See, supra, note 12, In re Watts-Woodward Press, Inc.; Herder v. Walther,
Misc. -, 9 N. Y. Supp. 926 (Common Pleas N. Y. Co. 1890); Mardsen v. Cornell,
62 N. Y. 215 (1875).
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The language of the refiling section dealing with conditional sales
(section 71, P. P. L.) is radically different from section 235 of the
Lien Law, and also different from section 65 of the Personal Property
Law governing the original filing of a conditional sale contract. Section 71 reads in part as follows: "The filing of conditional sale contracts provided for in section 65 . . . shall be valid for a period of
three years only. .

..

The validity of the filing may in each case

be extended for successive additional periods of one year from the
date of refiling, by filing in the proper filing district a copy of the
original contract within thirty days next preceding the expiration of
each period with a statement

.

."

etc.

It will be noted that section 71 makes the original "filing" of a
conditional sale contract invalid (apparently as against anyone) after
the expiration of three years unless properly extended by refiling. Section 235 of the Lien Law, on the other hand, makes the chattel mortgage contract itself invalid after the original period as against designated third parties. A conditional sale contract should, therefore, at
the end of three years from the original filing, be treated as an unfiled contract if not properly refiled. Hence even if later refiled, the
contract should be void as against lien creditors, purchasers or other
encumbrancers, who without knowledge of the outstanding conditional
vendor's security title, acquired their interests in the subject chattel
after the conditional *vendor's default in refiling.
The question of the impact on third parties' rights of failure to
properly refile a conditional sale contract has not yet arisen in the
state courts, but it has come up in the Federal District Court in In re
Kaufm=n.7 7 In that case a conditional sale contract executed on
January 25, 1928, was originally filed on September 26, 1928. It was
not refiled until October 8, 1931, in violation of the provisions of
section 71 of the Personal Property Law. The conditional buyer was
petitioned into bankruptcy on October 15, 1931. It had long been
held by Federal courts that a trustee in bankruptcy takes the status
of a Hen creditor as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. In the Kaufman case, therefore, we have a situation in which
the conditional sale contract is refiled late, but the creditor's lien
arises after the refiling. The court's decision in the case is in part
as follows:
"It is reasonably clear, therefore, that, whatever latitude may
77 1 F. Supp. 368 (N. D. N. Y. 1932).
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be given to the original filing of the conditional contracts of sale or
chattel mortgages, and however long their validity may continue if
finally filed before the claims of creditors arise as to chattel mortgages or the lien of the trustee in bankruptcy or of attaching creditors
arises as to the conditional contracts of sale, the law is fixed and rigid
as to the time of refiling. When the statute says so flatly, as it does
in Section 71, 'Filing of conditional sale contracts ...shall be valid
for a period of three years only', it must be taken to have the natural
meaning which the words imply. These words mean that, if not refiled within the last thirty days of the three years from the time of
the original filing, the original filing is invalid; that is to say, the
status of things is as if the conditional contract of sale had never
been filed."
"In the absence of any authorities to the contrary and in view of
the plain language of the statute as embodied in Section 71, that
filing should be valid only for three years, it must be held that, the
three years having elapsed in contemplation of the law, the vendor's
position is as if no filing had ever taken place."
If the decision in the Kaufman case is law in New York, we
have the following anomalous situation: if a conditional vendor takes
a signed conditional sales contract and holds it unfiled for four years
and then files it for the first time, he would prevail over lien creditors, purchasers or other encumbrancers, provided they acquired their
interests after the contract was filed. But, if the conditional vendor
filed the contract originally a day after it was executed and then
failed to refile it properly three years later, his default could not be
remedied and any lien creditor, purchaser, etc., who acquired his interest innocently after the vendor's belated refiling would prevail.
X.

REFILING--PRoPER PLACE

rules governing the place of refiling of chattel mortgages
are even more ambiguous, cumbersome and outmoded than those
78
dealing with the place of original filing.
They provide that where, at the time of refiling, the mortgagor
is a state resident, refiling must be done in the place of his residence
as of that time, and not in the place where the mortgage was originally filed. Where the mortgagor is a non-resident of the state, the
place for refiling is the original situs of the chattel (at the time the
mortgage was executed), and not its situs at the time of refiling.
However, if the chattel was located in New York City (outside
THE

78

N. Y. Lien Law § 235(2).
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the Borough of the Bronx) at the time the mortgage was executed,
then refiling must be done in the place or places where the original
filing took place, regardless of changes in residence or situs. To make
matters more absurd, a completely new and complex set of rules for
refiling is set up, if the mortgagor was a resident of the Borough of
the Bronx at the time the mortgage was executed.
In contrast, the refiling provisi6n for conditional sale contracts
(section 71, P. P. L.) is more concise, but, unfortunately, equally
ambiguous. The pertinent provision states: "The validity of the
filing may be in each case extended . . . by filing at the proper filing
district a copy.. . . Such copy, . . . shall be filed and entered in the

same manner as a contract or copy filed and entered for the first
time."
The words italicized for purposes of this discussion are certainly
not clear. What is the "proper" filing district for refiling purposes?
The statute does not say. Reasons for the resultant confusion stem
in part from the history of the adoption of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act in New York, and in part from imperfect drafting.
Section 6 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act requires the contract in all-cases to be originally filed in the place where the chattel
was first kept for use by the buyer after the sale, without regard to
the place of residence of the conditional vendor. 9
Section 14 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act provides that
if the chattel is thereafter removed during the original filing term
to another filing district, the contract must be refiled in the filing district to which the chattel is removed, within ten days after the conditional vendor has notice of the place of removal. 80
Section 11 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (dealing with
refiling at the end of the original filing term) provides that refiling
is to be made in the "proper" filing district."' The Act itself offers
no express guide as to what the "proper" filing district is. But since
the general scheme of the Act is to have filing follow the situs of the
chattel, it could be presumed that the place of refiling would be the
same as the place of last filing, i.e., the place where the chattel was
last located. The conditional vendor would, therefore, be safe in refiling in the district in which the chattel was last known by him to
'9 2 U. L. A.

80 Ibid.
81 Ibid,
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be situated. But from the point of view of constructive notice to
third parties who might deal with the conditional buyer after refiling,
the refiling provision of the Uniform Act offers scant protection. For
if the chattel had been removed by the buyer during the original
filing period to another filing district, without the knowledge of the
conditional vendor, the latter would naturally refile in the original
filing district; a place where a subsequent third party would never
search.
For example, if the chattel was originally kept for use in Albany
County (and the original filing was there), and then without the
knowledge of the conditional vendor it was removed to Westchester
County, where, four years later, an innocent purchaser buys it, the
latter would find nothing if he searched the records of Westchester
County. A timely refiling in Albany County by the conditional vendor might protect his lien as against such innocent purchaser.
Is Albany County, however, the "proper" place for refiling under
these circumstances? In the case of original filing, the burden was
on the conditional vendor to find out the exact filing district where
the chattel was first kept for use by the buyer after the sale.8 2 On
refiling, must the conditional vendor likewise, at his peril discover
the current location of the chattel, or may he rely on the "removal"
section of the statute to protect him against secret removals? The
Uniform Conditional Sales Act is not clear as to this point.
The New York adaptation of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
as to refiling is even less clear. The additional confusion comes because of the fact that when the legislature adopted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, it rejected the language of the Act as to original
83
filing and retained the language of the former New York statute.
That statute, under certain circumstances, required original filing to
be made in the place of residence of the conditional buyer. When it
came to the refiling provision, the New York legislature adopted
verbatim the language of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act which
did not fit in with the provisions of the old New York Act dealing
with the original filing. Hence the words "proper filing district" give
no guidance whatsoever to the conditional vendor as to where he must
refile. He does not know whether he should refile (1) in the current
82 Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Spellman, 160 Misc. 350, 289 N. Y. Supp. 352
(Sup. Ct. Franklin Co. 1936).
83 N. Y. Sess. Laws 1897, c. 418 § 117.
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place of residence of the conditional buyer; (2) in the current place
of location of the chattel; or (3) in the place of residence of the buyer, or situs of the chattel, as of the time the contract was executed.
It might be argued that the last sentence of section 71 furnishes
a clue to the proper place of refiling. It says in substance that, the
instrument shall, on refiling, be filed in the "same manner" as when
originally filed and entered. This language, however, apparently applies to the instructions to the filing officers as to the "manner" of
making the entries. It does not clarify the problem as to the place of
refiling.
XI.

CONCLUSION

TIs article has been limited in scope to the filing and refiling
provisions of the Lien Law and the Personal Property Law, in relation to chattel mortgages and conditional sales. It has taken up only
the conflict of rights between the creditor-holder of the security interest and third parties whose claims to the subject chattel
are derived from or through the debtor in possession. It has been
necessary for the writer to omit, purposely, many other important related provisions of the chattel mortgage and conditional
sales statutes. Among them are provisions relating to the rights and
obligations of the original parties to the contracts; the rights of
third parties where the debtor in possession of the chattel is given
liberty of sale; the rights of third parties where the subject chattels
are intended to become fixtures in real property; chattel mortgages
on intangibles and on after-acquired property; and the special rules
governing particular transactions such as installment contracts for
consumer goods.
Suggestions for changes, therefore, will be restricted to those
areas which have been covered in this article. Recommendations for
changes in these areas have, of course, been made by others in the
past. The most comprehensive suggested recodification, the Uniform Commercial Code, contains in Article IX an entirely new look
at the chattel security law. The Code as a whole has apparently been
laid to its final rest in New York State.84 Some persons advocate,
however, taking Article IX out of the Code and making it law in
84 Report of New York Law Revision Commission, Leg. Doc. No. 69(A) (1956)
saying in part: "... that the Uniform Commercial Code is not satisfactory in its present form and cannot be made satisfactory without comprehensive reexamination and

revision in the light of the critical comment obtainable."
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New York. The writer does not wish to engage in an extended discussion of such a suggestion, except to express doubt as to the advisability of taking a part of a code out of its context. This is a
familiar practice that has caused many of our present problems, as
this article has pointed out.
One immediately feasible change is almost self-evident, namely
that the similarity in function of the conditional sale and of the chattel
mortgage makes it desirable for both instruments to be governed by
one statute.8 5 The New York legislature, in its latest legislation on
consumer installment contracts has adopted this idea. 6
In dealing with the effect of filing, non-filing and late filing on
the rights of the security-interest holder and of third parties, a realistic modern policy as to the actual objectives of a filing system must
first be agreed on. Despite lip-service to the doctrine, the courts have
in many situations in the past disregarded the theory of "constructive notice." In chattel mortgage cases, creditors of mortgagors have
been permitted to prevail over mortgagees regardless of notice, constructive or otherwise. Strict conformance with the filing and refiling
provisions, as presently expressed in the statutes, frequently results
in concealing rather than uncovering outstanding security interests.
Hence, constructive notice to third parties is a delusion.
Furthermore, the doctrine of "ostensible ownership" by reason
of overt possession, was never a logical one (in the case of bailees the
courts have always ignored it) and, in modern times, it has no validity. Creditors today do not extend credit on the basis of physical
examination of the debtor's visible tangible assets. Indeed, in many
cases, debtors are credit-worthy even though they have no visible
property but such assets only as accounts receivable, patent rights,
licenses, etc. Most creditors today rely on the reports of credit agencies, or, as do these agencies, they require financial statements from
prospective debtors in which outstanding secured claims against
debtor's assets are indicated. If the debtor conceals the facts he is
liable to many penalties, both civil and criminal.
To be sure, if legal protection were afforded to secret liens and
85 "The theory of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act is that these two transactions (conditional sales and chattel mortgages) should be treated alike in the law,
since they have identical objects and effects." Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional
Sales, 2-a U. L. A. 11. See also, New York Law Revision Commission-Report, Recommendations and Studies, Leg. Doc. No. 65(N) at 788 (1936).
86 N. Y. Sess. Laws 1957 c. 599, eff. Oct. 1, 1957.
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other secret security interests, it would encourage spurious claims in
fraud of creditors and others. Public filing of a contract granting a
security interest is therefore desirable for the purpose of publishing
that the interest was created in good faith and establishing the time
of its creation. It is also a desirable procedure in order to perfect a
security interest against, and give it priority over, subsequent interests in the subject chattel.
To enforce promptness in filing, a time limit should be set by
statute, within which a copy of the contract must be filed. If not filed
within the time limit, the security interest should be void as to all
persons other than the original party debtor, regardless of actual
knowledge of the outstanding security interest. The writer suggests
that the security interest be void, if not timely filed, as against creditors, purchasers and other encumbrancers even though they have
knowledge of the security interest, because proof or disproof of actual
notice has always been troublesome. The specific rights of parties in
specific chattels should not be made to depend on the uncertainty
of evidence of notice, oral or otherwise, and the reactions of future
triers of fact. The long established rule that creditors can set aside
a late-filed chattel mortgage, regardless of their knowledge of the
outstanding mortgage interest, has never shocked the conscience of
legislatures or courts, and, indeed, has been quoted with approval by
the New York Law Revision Commission as an incentive to prompt
filing.87 If it works for creditors, it should also be effective for purchasers and other encumbrancers.
On the other hand, the statute should expressly recognize that
the third party, entitled to prevail over the unfiled or late filed security interest, be one who has a specific right to the subject chattel.
This would mean that creditors would be entitled to priority against
security interests in specific chattels only if they obtained a lien
against that chattel. In view of the practical necessity for a short
time interval between execution of the contract and filing, the statute
should, as presently provided in the Uniform Trust Receipts Act,
provide that a security interest be valid against all persons for a short
period (five days might be enough) without filing.
Of course, to be consistent, the statute should give the status
of a lien creditor to all creditors' representatives, such as assignees
87

Report New York Law Revision Commission at 184 (1938).

1957]

THIRD PARTY RIGHTS

for the benefit of creditors, equity receivers, trustees in bankruptcy
(who already have that status by the Bankruptcy Act) and personal
representatives of insolvent decedent's estates.8
Finally, all absurdities now existing as to the place of filing and
refiling within the state could be obviated by providing for a single central filing place for all chattel mortgages and conditional sales contracts
covering chattels kept for use in the state. A central filing place is
established today as to certificates of incorporation, automobile registrations, statements of trust receipt financing and the like. It represents no insurmountable administrative problem. A proper regard
for the public interest should overcome local opposition based upon
local economic and political considerations.
The time may come when it might be found possible and desirable to incorporate all laws dealing with security interests in a
single comprehensive statute. In view of the resistance to change,
however, in the face of old habits and tradition, it might be well
to reform slowly and confine immediate recodification to the provisions of the Lien Law and Personal Property Law dealing with
chattel mortgages and conditional sales. The experiment may well
point the way to further progress in the much needed adjustment of
our commercial laws to modern business practices.
88 As a suggestion, see definition of "Lien Creditor" in the Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act, drafted by Prof. Williston, see, supra, note 28, Handbook of the-National
Conference of Commissioners, etc.

